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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to examine famers‟ willingness to pay for an index based 
microinsurance scheme (IBMS) for paddy crops to protect against production loss caused by 
natural disasters in Sri Lanka and to assess product preferences for this IBMS. The contingent 
valuation method (CV) was used to elicit the willingness to pay for the hypothetical IBMS. For 
product preferences, a conjoint analysis was conducted to study their relative importance and to 
discover the relationships between different attributes and the characteristics of the respondents. 
The results show that the interest in joining IBMS is 88% (SD=2.4%) overall. When willingness 
to pay is assessed, it is found that most potential purchasers would prefer a higher level than that 
offered by the existing conventional insurance plan. The results of the preference analyses 
demonstrate that for IBMS products can be adapted for specific locations in order to maintain 
demand.  These findings provide strong support for launching IBMS in Sri Lanka.  
 
Keywords: Conjoint analysis, Contingent valuation, Index based insurance, Microinsurance 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Risk is an unavoidable but manageable element through insurance. A growing body of 
literature on agricultural financial markets in developing countries reveals opportunities for 
innovative agricultural insurance. Microinsurance with an index based indemnification 
mechanism is increasing attention on present day agricultural risk management (Skees, and 
Barnett, 2006: Roth and McCord, 2008: Patt, Peterson, Carter, Velez, Hess and Suarez, 2009). 
The incorporation of these two concepts can be called Index Based Microinsurance Scheme 
(IBMS). However, in the case of Sri Lanka IMBS has not yet been tested. The main objective of 
this study is to examine famers‟ willingness to pay and preferences for product attributes of 
IBMS for paddy crops cultivated by small-scale (peasant)
1
 farmers in Sri Lanka, in the context of 
production risk caused by natural disasters. The findings of this study will, it is hoped, be used to 
support the creation of a more efficient and realistic pricing policy and marketing for IBMS.  
The study is motivated by the fact that Sri Lankan agriculture is highly vulnerable to risk 
and uncertainty. Sri Lanka frequently suffers from natural disasters, among which water-induced 
disasters such as floods, droughts and landslides are the most common and destructive types 
(DMC-SL, 2010). Currently, Sri Lankan farmers can insure most of their crops through the 
conventional crop insurance schemes conducted by the government-owned Agricultural and 
Agrarian Insurance Board (AAIB). Although the Board has been operating for more than five 
decades, voluntary participation has drastically decreased. Its level of penetration among 
potential clients is currently less than 5 percent. Among the main causes for low confidence in 
this scheme are the lack of transparency in loss assessment and underestimation in indemnity 
payments (Rambukwella, Vidanapathirana and Somaratne, 2007). Moreover, rain-fed areas are 
not targeted for insurance by the Board. However, looking at the paddy sown by irrigation types 
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in the last ten years (2000-2010) at national level, it can be seen that rain-fed paddy sown extent 
contribution is 24 percent (DCS-SL, 2010). AAIB insurance products perform as individual 
contracts and indemnities based on the individual‟s own yield. Usually this type of contract 
suffers from asymmetric information problems like moral hazard and adverse selection; high 
administrative cost is another impediment.  Moreover, the government schemes are not based on 
actuarial principles and are deemed unsustainable. Performance of publicly supported crop 
insurance has been inefficient when all costs are considered (Hazell, 1992). Traditionally, 
insurers have been paying claims that were assessed based on individual losses, the so-called 
indemnity-based insurance (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt, 2006). Due to the high 
costs of the claim settlement process, resulting from indemnity-based insurance relative to the 
values insured in developing countries, index-based schemes have become increasingly useful, 
particularly for smallholding farmers, with limited government involvement (Skees, Hazell, and 
Miranda, 1999). Therefore, this innovative insurance may have a huge potential for agricultural 
risk management in Sri Lanka.  
Rice is the dominant crop in Sri Lanka, cultivated by a large number of small-scale 
subsistence farmers living in the rural areas. Ninety percent of poor households earn their living 
in the rural agricultural economy. Moreover, most farmers live under or close to the poverty line. 
In this context, Sri Lanka National Agricultural Policy (SLNAP) proposes to “introduce 
appropriate agricultural insurance schemes to protect the farmers from the risks associated with 
natural calamities” (SLNAP, 2006 p.6). The draft version circulated for comments further 
asserted that “a national agricultural insurance scheme will be implemented to cover all farmers 
and all crops throughout the country to insulate the farmers from financial distress caused by 
natural disaster and making agricultural [make agriculture] financially viable”, emphasizing 
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“collaboration with public and private sector” (SLNAP-D, 2006 p.11).   This suggests, therefore, 
that agricultural insurance is a particularly important risk mitigation measure out of the many 
adopted in the country.  
Emerging research has been conducted in several developing countries that focuses on 
innovative low-cost approaches to mitigate the conventional problems associated with crop 
insurance, and the affordability and sustainability of such products. The main theoretical and 
empirical arguments concentrate on index based products, the microinsurance approach, 
community-based financial intermediaries, and public policy, including the role of government 
in market-based insurance and in encouraging private sector agricultural insurance (Nieuwoudt, 
2000; Dercon, 2005; Leftley and Roth, 2006; Skees , Barnett and Hartell , 2006;  Bhattamishra  
and  Barrett, 2008).  
An Innovation in Agricultural Insurance 
Index-based insurance products: The potential for the use of index based insurance products in 
agriculture is significant. Any independent gauge can be used and developed as an index for an 
insurance contract which is secure and must be highly correlated with agricultural losses (Skees, 
2001). Various measures can be used as indices such as meteorological variables (rainfall, 
temperature, wind speed, etc.), satellite images, area yield and price, and even the mortality rate 
of livestock. In developing countries, the practical feasibility of more than 25 index-based risk 
transfer schemes has been reported and the start-up and implementation of pilot schemes has 
been investigated. The majority of these schemes are insurance products with payouts linked to a 
publicly-verifiable aggregate index. Most index-based insurance schemes address either 
production (yield) risk or price risk, and are aimed at a specific crop (Skees, Murphy, Collier, 
McCord and Roth, 2008).  
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It is too early to draw any general conclusions about the long-run sustainability of these 
efforts due to the fact that the majority of these schemes are still in their preliminary stages. The 
experiences in Mexico and India suggests that, at least in some areas, these programs may be an 
effective risk transfer mechanism for the rural poor (Levin and Reinhard, 2006; Barnett and 
Mahul, 2007). However, scalability and sustainability depend on several factors. Scalability 
includes access or coverage participation and the operating and administering costs of products. 
For long term sustainability, a program should achieve several elements such as the willingness 
of farmers to contribute over the long term, fit with the country‟s regulatory environment, and 
private sector participation (Smith and Watts, n.d.). 
Increasing interest to implement index based insurance products rather than traditional 
agricultural insurance is well documented. Index based products offer various advantages over 
other risk-coping mechanisms and traditional insurance programs including lack of moral hazard, 
lack of adverse selection, and low administrative costs. Moreover, index-based products feature 
standardized and transparent structure, re-insurance function, greater availability and the ability 
of parties to negotiate terms and conditions (Skees, et al., 2006; Roth and McCord, 2008). They 
also offer protection against numerous social perils including famine and other catastrophes 
(Skees, 2008). 
The main challenge in index based insurance is called basis risk, where there is the 
possibility of a mismatch between the index and the losses of the insured (Miranda, 1991). 
However, a substantial number of suggestions to manage this problem have been proposed. 
Improved data and product design may be able to minimize basis risk (Roth and McCord, 2008). 
An Index based product is required to be developed for a small geographic area (Smith and 
Watts, n.d.). Conversely, spatial basis risk is lower for client associations relative to individuals 
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due to aggregation (Varangis, 2002; Glauber, 2004).Farmer participation to design the product 
and government intervention through providing infrastructure and services would help minimize 
this basis risk problem (Clarke and Dercon, 2009). Many attempts have already been made to 
incorporate this index based indemnification mechanism and microinsurance concept. The 
following section briefly summarizes the microinsurance concept and its unique features. 
 
Microinsurance Approach: Microinsurance, a subset of financial tools that belong to 
microfinance, is now widely recognized and is emerging as a flexible and powerful instrument in 
developing countries. In addition, it has some basis risk reduction features, including farmer 
participation in design, small groups‟ involvement, quick response, and small geographic 
implementation areas, and has certain characteristics (See Table 1). Microinsurance specifically 
sets out to provide affordable and accessible insurance to low-income people who cannot gain 
access to traditional forms of insurance (Churchill, 2006: Osgood and Warren 2007). Among the 
main attributes of this product are consideration of members‟ willingness to pay and low-cost 
transactions. Microinsurance involves payment of premiums in small amounts and is often 
designed to accommodate clients‟ irregular cash flows, in return for pre-specified payouts when 
specific conditions occur. Microinsurance can be implemented either on an individual basis or 
based on groups, but typically communities are involved in the important phases of the process 
such as package design and rationing of benefits. The essential role of the network of 
microinsurance units is to enhance risk management of the members of the entire pool of 
microinsurance units over and above what each can do when operating as a stand-alone entity. 
Microinsurance is implemented and distributed through various channels. Community-based and 
mutual insurance schemes now exist side by side with commercial insurers that have started to 
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recognize the potential market among low-income clients (Churchill, 2006; Roth, McCord and 
Liber, 2007). In essence, microinsurance has the same purpose as traditional insurance. It draws 
on the same generally accepted practices as traditional insurance. For example, actuarial pricing, 
reinsurance, and claims handling practices follow traditional insurance. However, Experience of 
microinsurance in low income markets has shown that there are fundamental differences (See 
Table 1). 
Table 1: Differences between traditional insurance and microinsurance 
 Traditional insurance Microinsurance 
Clients 
 
• Low risk environment 
• Established insurance culture 
• Higher risk exposure/high 
vulnerability 
• Weak insurance culture 
Distribution 
models 
 
• Sold by licensed  
intermediaries or by insurance 
companies directly to wealthy 
clients or companies that 
understand insurance 
• Sold by non-traditional intermediaries 
to clients with little experience of 
insurance 
 
Policies 
 
• Complex policy documents 
with many exclusions 
 
• Simple language 
• Few, if any, exclusions 
• Group policies 
Premium 
calculation 
 
• Good statistical data 
• Pricing based on individual risk 
(age and other characteristics) 
 
• Little historical data 
• Group pricing 
• Often higher premium to cover ratios 
• Very price sensitive market  
Premium 
collection 
 
• Monthly to yearly payments, 
often-paid by mail-based on an 
invoice, or by debit orders 
 
• Frequent and irregular payments 
adapted to volatile cash flows of clients 
• Often linked with other transactions 
(e.g. loan repayment)  
Control of 
insurance risk 
(adverse 
selection, 
moral hazard, 
fraud) 
• Limited eligibility 
• Significant documentation 
required 
• Screenings, such as medical 
tests, may be required 
• Broad eligibility 
• Limited but effective controls (reduces 
costs) 
• Insurance risk included in premiums 
rather than controlled by exclusions 
• Link to other services (e.g. credit)  
Claims handling • Complicated processes 
• Extensive verification 
documentation  
• Simple and fast procedures for small 
sums 
• Efficient fraud control  
Source: Adapted from Lloyds- Microinsurance Report 2009, http://www.lloyds.com 
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Due to its group-based nature, microinsurance can exploit informational advantages that 
are not available to private or public insurers that deal with individuals, thereby overcoming 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. While moral hazard problems can be mitigated by 
peer monitoring, adverse selection problems are often addressed in a variety of ways, such as 
requiring a minimum pool size before insurance coverage comes into effect (Tabor, 2005). 
Although the microinsurance movement is relatively recent, it is becoming an increasingly 
popular way of addressing even disaster shocks. Agricultural index based microinsurance is an 
affordable risk management tool for smallholder farmers with limited government involvement.  
In this context, the index based micro approach has been tested in many developing countries in 
an attempt to address conventional problems. Index based microinsurance could guarantee a 
higher degree of community participation as a new way to stabilize the income of the rural poor 
(Levin and Reinhard, 2006; Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt, 2006). The best example 
is Andhra Pradesh in India, where a microfinance institution (BASIX) has collaborated with an 
insurer (ICICI-Lombard) to provide index coverage to farmers (Gine, Townsend and Vickery, 
2007). 
METHODS 
Study Area, Sample and Data Collection: Ampara district, on Sri Lanka‟s eastern plain was 
selected to conduct the field survey. The selection of the study area was carried out through a 
multi-stage screening process based on multi hazard risk and paddy production. Ampara has 
considerable exposure to natural disaster risks (Zubair, Ralapanawe, Tennakoon, Yahiya and 
Perera, 2005) and is the highest rice producing district among the paddy producing districts in Sri 
Lanka. Out of 29 agrarian service centers in Ampara district, ten agrarian service center 
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divisions
2
 were selected to collect the primary data.  This selection also particularly based on 
disaster occurrence within the last ten years. 
The study was able to capture three different stratums based on irrigation types, which 
represent risk disparity. Approximately 75 percent of paddy cultivation lands are under the major 
irrigations systems. About 6 percent and 18 percent of land are under minor irrigation systems 
and rain-fed systems, respectively. A semi-controlled method was used to select a sample of 60 
households within each of the irrigation types (stratums). In this sample, 25 percent of 
households were at least one time members of the AAIB insurance scheme and of the other 75 
percent were non-members of any crop insurance scheme. The households were chosen through 
a simple random sampling technique. The AAIB member list and election registration list 
(excluding the names of the AAIB members) were used as the sampling frame with the total 
sample size being 180 farmers. The sample households depend on paddy cultivation for their 
livelihood. 
The study of willingness to pay is often done using with hypothetical questioning.  We 
used face to face interview methods with a structured questionnaire schedule for data collection.  
Before each interview session, a brief education session for explaining how insurance works was 
conducted. Furthermore, an illustrated handout was used to educate and explain core concepts of 
index insurance with all possible indexes for a particular area and to explain the benefits and 
implementation procedure with microinsurance attributes for farmers. The surveys were 
conducted by trained university postgraduate students together with local enumerators to interact 
with farmers, clarifying any doubts to minimize non-response rates and judging their sincerity. 
Measurement of Variables and Method of Analysis: The contingent valuation method (CV) is 
used to elicit individual‟s WTP for the hypostatical index based insurance.  However, very 
10 
 
limited research has been done on WTP studies using CV methods for agricultural insurance.  
Patrick (1988) and, Vandeveer and Loehman (1994) used a single dichotomous (yes/no) choice 
question to study producers‟ demand for multiple peril crop insurance, rainfall insurance and 
other modifications of crop insurance. In the developing country context, McCarthy (2003) as 
well as Sarris, Krfakis and Christiaensen‟s (2006) studies have examined willingness to pay for 
rainfall index based on crop insurance by using single and one-and-a-half CV questions based on 
Morocco and Tanzania, respectively. 
We model a farmer‟s willingness to pay for IBMS as four distinct decisions, which were 
included for 50 percent and 25 percent tolerance levels and 100 percent and 80 percent coverage 
contracts. Each contract has a lower and upper bound value; this study used initial or stating 
values as existing AAIB premiums. Maximum premium amount and minimum amount were 
used to construct the bid value range. The lower bound coincided with the existing AAIB 
contract premium value minus 15 percent load. The upper bound was equal to the AAIB 
premium value plus 15 percent load.  All fractional numbers were rounded. The upper (lower) 
bound of the WTP thus reflects the minimum (maximum) offer price that households gave in 
response to the willingness to pay question.  
Table 2: Contract parameters  
  Premium -  Sri Lanka Rupees (SLRs)./acre per full crop  season 
  
Trigger  
  
Coverage  
Major Irrigation Minor  Irrigation Rain-fed 
Lower 
Bound Bid  
value (Rs) 
Upper 
Bound Bid 
Value  (Rs) 
Lower 
Bound Bid  
value (Rs) 
Upper 
Bound Bid 
Value  (Rs) 
Lower 
Bound Bid  
value (Rs) 
Upper 
Bound Bid 
Value  (Rs) 
25% 
Trigger  
100%  
Coverage 
1900 2600 600 775 500 700 
25% 
Trigger  
80%   
Coverage 
1500 2000 460 625 450 600 
50% 
Trigger  
100%  
Coverage 
775 1000 425 575 340 460 
50% 
Trigger  
80%   
Coverage 
250 350 212.5 290 170 230 
Source: Author's calculations based on the AAIB data   
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In this study, we used the one and half bound dichotomous choice format by following up 
questions for the purpose of the statistical efficiency and reliability (Saleem, Coble, Hudson, 
Miller, Hanson and Sempier, 2008). Under this design farmers were first asked to select two 
contracts and educated to consider each contract as if it were the only choice available. Of the 
above four possible combinations, the first offered a higher coverage (100% level) and lower 
damage (25% from strike level) contract, and, if the farmer declined, then we offered the lower 
coverage (80%) for similar damage level. If the farmers are still not interested in the product, we 
offered the higher damage (50%) design and followed likewise.  
Then, moving to applicable bid questions constructed in terms of irrigation type, each 
farmer was asked if s/he is willing to pay an upper bound contract, and then offered a follow- up 
question. If s/he said „no‟ to the first bid, a lower bid would be given and her/his willingness to 
pay is asked and offered a follow- up question if the response was “yes”. This follow- up 
question was open ended.   If s/he said „no‟ to the upper bound bid, then s/he would be asked to 
how much s/he is willing to pay.   If s/he said „yes‟ to the lower bound  bid then s/he would be 
asked to mention the maximum that s/he is willing to pay. Under this elicitation procedure, one 
potential limitation of contingent valuation method is related to the bias which may arise from 
the starting point of the bid. In this study, this bias is reduced by using an open ended follow- up 
question (McCarthy, 2003). 
The choice experiment conjoint analysis was used to evaluate and determine consumer 
preferences for certain insurance product attributes.  The applicability of conjoint techniques and 
related stated preference methods to recovering consumer preferences has been widely 
demonstrated in diverse applications, including farmers‟ preferences for crop insurance attributes 
(Haefele and Loomis, 2001). Finally, examining the relationships between the socioeconomic 
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characteristics of paddy famers and their product choice behavior is vital for developing product 
design and for justification of microinsurance necessity. Therefore, to determine the impact of 
farmer characteristic on a different alternate product attributes according to the product choice 
ranks, we considered only group plan preferences in this study. 
Explanatory variables: The basic description and the definition of explanatory variables used in 
the analysis are presented in Table 3 in the following section. 
Table 3: Description of independent variables and hypothesized relationship  
Variables Explanation Measurement Hypothesized 
relationship  
Age of  farmer 
AGE_HH 
AGE_SQR 
 
 
 
the square of the age 
variable 
A continuous quantitative 
measurement 
The younger the 
people, the more the 
WTP 
Education level  
 
 
EDU_LVL 
Education grade 
completed  by  farmer  
 
1 – no schooling 
2 - up to Grade 5  
3 - Grade 6 to  9 
4 – GCE /Ordinary  Level 
5 – GCE /Advance  Level 
6– higher (college/ 
university) 
Higher level of 
education will 
increase WTP 
Labour capital  
 
LAB_CAP 
15 to 65 years old 
members in household 
(Active members) 
A continuous quantitative 
measurement 
 
Higher numbers of 
household residents 
will lead to lower 
WTP 
Farming 
experience  
FAR_EXP 
Number of years of 
paddy cultivation  
A continuous quantitative 
measurement 
Higher experience 
in years will lead to 
lower WTP 
Paddy farm 
size  
FAM_SIZE 
Number of acres of 
paddy land owned by 
farmer  
A continuous quantitative 
measurement of number 
of acres 
The higher land 
holding  the higher 
the WTP 
Natural log of 
household 
expenditure per 
capita  
LOG_EXP-PC  
Average amount that 
household spent on 
household needs per 
month divided by 
household size  
 
A continuous quantitative 
measurement 
The higher the 
expenditure, the 
higher WTP 
Outstanding 
debt  
OUT_DEBT 
 Total value of all the 
outstanding debts SLRs. 
A continuous quantitative 
measure  
 
Borrowing money 
will lead to 
decreased WTP 
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Geographic 
location  
 
 
MAJ_IRR***
 
MIN_IRR** 
RAIN_FED* 
Measures whether a  
farmer ‟s farm is located  
in major
***
 irrigation , 
minor irrigation
**
 or 
rain- fed
*
  area  
1 = If farm is located in 
major Irrigation, 0 = 
otherwise 
Rain-fed   farmers  
will be more WTP  
for insurance than 
irrigated area  
farmers 
1 = If farm is located in  
minor Irrigation, 0 = 
otherwise 
1 = If farm is located in 
rain-fed, 0 = otherwise 
 
 
Social capital index (SCP_INDEX): In addition to the above typical demographics and socio-
economic characteristics, we hypothesize that social capital would influence farmers‟ WTP for 
the IBMS. This concept and its influence on microfinance have been growing rapidly in the 
developing world.  A recent piece of literature states that community or group based 
microinsurance schemes are able to mobilize social capital to encourage voluntary affiliation of 
resource-poor persons in the informal economy.  It suggested that trust and community networks 
at the local level (proxies for social capital) have a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
activities within microinsurance programs (Dror, 2007). Therefore, we include a social capital 
index for our analysis.  Social capital is measured by trust, reciprocity and associations, each of 
which is composed of seven questions with the answers scaled. Five point Likert scales were 
used to measure peoples‟ attitudes by asking them the degree of importance. We used a 
questionnaire related to social capital suggested by Grootaert, Narayan, Jones and Woolcock 
(2003) to choose the five questions for each.  The variables were reduced using factor analysis. 
Each household level social capital was calculated by the sum of scores from each question 
divided by total maximum sum of scores.  
Income diversification index (IND_INDEX): Similar methods were used to construct the other 
indexes as well. Regarding the diversification of income, the survey used 14 different incomes 
sources.  For simplicity in analysis, income sources other than paddy income are divided into 
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four categories. These are: - wage employment, self-employment, agriculture, as only income 
generating activity and other sources such as received social benefits or grants from government 
or other organizations. In all, the four variables were used together to construct the income 
diversification index. It was hypothesized that a higher number of income sources will lead to 
lower WTP  
Assets index (AST_INDEX): Assets base play a pivotal role among households, particularly in 
agrarian societies where incomes are closer to the subsistence level. We constructed an asset 
index which captures the ownership of physical assets within the last six years as a reflection of 
wealth and savings. The assets considered included consumer and farm durables such as colour 
televisions, CD players/radios, refrigerators, gas cookers, tractors, motorbikes etc. and are an 
indication of the level of disposable income in a household. It should be noted that constructed 
assets index using a weighted on the newest ones and zero-weighted on the assets which were 
more than six years old.  We hypothesized that a higher asset index will lead to a higher WTP. 
Awareness index (AWR_INDEX): In addition, we also created an awareness index using the 
weighted to AAIB members and none-weighted for the rest of the farmers. Moreover, we 
combined different questions such as knowledge about types of insurance products, attitudes 
towards insurance, and numbers of insurance company known by names of the households, to 
build this index. We hypothesized that people with experience of insurance affairs will be more 
WTP than others.  
Dependent variables: Based on the contingent valuation questions described above, we 
generated a series of dependent variables for analyses on difference aspect. All dependent 
variables are listed in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Description of dependent variables  
Variables  Description  Measurement 
WTP Mean willingness to pay for IBMS  A continuous quantitative measure 
SLRs 
BID Willingness to preference for IBMS across the risk tolerance and coverage  bid 
value 
1 25% Trigger,  100%  Coverage  1 = Bid value 1   0=if  otherwise 
2 25% Trigger,  80%   Coverage  1 = Bid value 2   0=if  otherwise 
3 50% Trigger,  100%  Coverage 1 = Bid value 3   0=if  otherwise 
4 50% Trigger,  80%   Coverage 1 = Bid value 4   0=if  otherwise 
 
Data analysis: The study employed a probit regression model to estimate the mean WTP interms 
of preference and geographical location with bid contract as an explanatory variable. Finally, we 
observed farmer characteristics to preference on bid scenarios and attributes using multinomial 
logit regression. All data is analyzed with STATA statistical software. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, before discussing the econometric analytical results, we will quickly 
summarize the descriptive characteristics of sample households. The age distribution shows that 
the majority of respondent farmers were slightly old; the average age of farmers being 52 years, 
and every farmer had completed some level of formal education. Almost 70 percent of 
respondent farmers fell in the primary education category (Passed grade 5 to grade 10) and the 
other 22 percent and 8 percent obtained GCE (O/L) and the GCE (A/L) qualifications
3
, 
respectively. Most of the farmers average a total of 38 years of paddy farming experience and 
range between 14 to 70 years in the study area. This study also revealed that the majority of the 
households have large family sizes with  an average of 5 individuals and range from 3 to 7 
persons and that the average number of active members, who fall in the 15 to 65 years category, 
is 3 persons. The average farm operation size was 3 acres and the entire sample is owner 
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cultivation. The class-size classification of agricultural holdings clearly reveals the dominance of 
small and marginal farmers in agricultural operation of the study area.  
Farmers reported that they tend to rely heavily on farm income sources. Many rural 
households grow paddy for their own consumption and sell their surpluses. While 95 percent of 
the farm household members engaged in more than one off- paddy farm activity to support their 
livelihood. 
Surveys revealed that most of these assets were purchased more than six years earlier and 
assets base is comparatively high in the major irrigation community. Assets also serve as a form 
of savings; however, as explains that the kinds of assets which may be used by a household at 
any point in time depends on the severity of the income failure and the liquidity of the assets. An 
average monthly expenditure was used as a proxy for income, which was 2500 SLRs per person 
at the 2010 price level in this sample. The majority (99 percent) of farmer households was below 
the mean national average income per person per month (SLRs6463) and 95 percent below the 
average income per person per month at the district level as well (SLRs4754) (DCS-SL, 2010). 
Most of the sample households (75 percent) live below the official poverty line at the national 
level for June 2010 (SLRs3098) defined by the department of census and statistics in Sri Lanka. 
The level of outstanding debt is an indicator that there are fewer resources to spend on the 
conventional insurance. Approximately 40 percent of the sample farmers   had outstanding debt.  
Farmers were well aware of the different types of insurance products in the study area. 
The survey revealed that households were aware of 92 percent of agricultural and crop insurance 
in the full sample. Even 71 percent farmers were aware of agricultural and crop insurance who 
were not members of the government AAIB. Moreover, out of all the farmers in study area, 
about 74 percent were aware of life insurance, 27 percent of funeral insurance, 44 percent of 
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health insurance and 10 percent were aware of disability insurance. Only 5 percent of the 
households were not aware of any insurance products at all. Awareness is high in the major 
irrigation area, and very low in the extremely poor income group. 
Encouragingly, according to the descriptive statistics, participants expressed a clear willingness 
to join for index based microinsurance, out of 180 farmers who entered, a sample of 88 percent 
were willing to join the proposed index base insurance scheme including microinsurance 
attribute. 
Willingness to pay for hypothetical Index Based Microinsurance Scheme (IBMS): We 
constructed three deferent regression models across the irrigation types for examine households‟ 
willingness to pay pattern by using OLS estimation. The dependant variable is a maximum 
amount (SLRs) of willingness to pay for acre per full crop season in IBMS product. A summary 
of the final OLS models developed at irrigation types is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Factors influencing farmers‟ willingness to pay for the IBMS by irrigation type 
 Major Irrigation Minor  Irrigation Rain- Fed 
 Coefficients Robust  
Std. Err.       
Coefficients Robust  
Std. Err.       
Coefficients Robust  
Std. Err.       
AGE_HH -290.635** 95.917 -28.007 65.457 -112.422** 46.762 
AGE_SQR 2.213** 0.668 -0.208 0.336 0.855 0.433 
EDU_LVL 529.738 279.448 142.472 149.291 1.321 109.599 
LAB_CAP -86.958 105.275 -127.941* 85.879 -1.540* 40.905 
FAR_EXP 46.655 64.744 54.944 47.521 25.806* 19.820 
FAM_SIZE -93.257 91.799 -35.506 42.300 -50.192* 26.708 
OUT_DEBT 0.014 0.580 0.048 0.387 0.031** 0.116 
SCP_INDEX 13.897** 2.922 15.886** 3.306 18.685** 2.045 
IND_INDEX -1.130 3.615 -3.801* 2.372 -0.711* 0.986 
AST_INDEX 8.177* 5.277 0.269 4.449 7.788 4.436 
AWR_INDEX 1.415 2.609 2.716** 1.415 1.711** 0.998 
LOG_EXP-PC -401.220* 264.134 170.359 147.847 -179.803 128.611 
INTERCEPT 7299.234* 2151.053 -671.860* 1317.765 1495.585* 1067.860 
R-squared 0.7711 0.7997  0.8522 
Number of obs.        60 60  60 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
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As we expected, the younger farmers were more likely to pay than the elderly in rain-fed 
and major irrigation areas, but age was not  a significant factor to WTP among the minor 
irrigation farmers while age square variable was positively significant only in the major 
irrigation community. We also hypothesized that younger and more educated farmers could 
understand the product more easily, and be more likely to pay; in this sense, education and asset 
bases were significant with positive sign at major irrigation areas.  Farm size was not significant 
in irrigated areas because it may homogenize plot size. However, there was a positive significant 
relationship on farm size at rain-fed areas, which indicates that farmers who have more land to 
cultivate are more willing to pay a higher premium for insurance. 
Outstanding debt index is a positive influence on the probability of farmers WTP in rain-
fed areas (p < .05). This variable is insignificant for other areas. This could imply that farmers 
with rain-fed areas and more debt demonstrate higher demand for insurance since their risk is 
higher than other irrigated lands.  
Awareness index was again an important determinant in minor and rain-fed communities, 
which is positively significant. But this index was not significantly associated with major 
irrigation farmers‟ decisions. A similar trend also appears in income diversification and labor 
capital indexes. One of the common characteristic of these models is the greater dependency on 
the social capital variable.  As we expected, it indicates that there is enough possibility for a 
group formation to group based product. Its indication on society's social interactions is to 
facilitate farmers to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam, 1993). 
However, expenditure per capita was only significant at major irrigation areas. Its negative 
coefficient estimate implies that more expenditure results in less probability of WTP for 
insurance. 
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Preferences for Crop Insurance Contract Features and Attributes 
This section assesses the relative importance of different features of a crop insurance product. 
According to insurance literature many attributes can generate to test for farmers‟ preferences. In 
this study, we select four most important crop insurance product characteristics. (1) 
Indemnification base- bid contract, (2) Insurance plan, (3) frequency of premium payment, and 
(4) Delivery choice. 
Farmers’ Preferences to Indemnification base - Bid contracts: The premium bids reflect the 
farmers' risk preferences, and major irrigation farmers are more risk averse than others farmers. 
Almost half of the major irrigation farmers were concentrated on the 25 percent trigger level; 
however, minor and rain-fed farmer‟s toleration capacities were comparatively high at 55 and 57 
percent, respectively. Rain-fed farmers were highly attracted to the 80 percent coverage level and 
most irrigated farmers preferred the 100 percent coverage. Contract preferences percentages are 
reported in Table 6. 
Table 6: Preference for bid contracts by irrigation types- Percentage  
 Major Irrigation Minor  Irrigation Rain-Fed Total 
25% Trigger, 100%  Coverage 
38  27  16   
 48  36  16 100 
25% Trigger, 80%   Coverage 
18  18  27   
 30  33  36 100 
50% Trigger, 100%  Coverage 
27  42  27   
 29  48  23 100 
50% Trigger,  80%   Coverage 
16  13  30   
 30  27  43 100 
Total 100  100  100   
Source: Microinsurance for Agricultural Risk Mitigation in Sri Lanka, Field Survey- 2010 
 
In further analysis, we measured other explanatory variables that may affect farmer‟s demand for 
insurance at four different scenarios. This multinomial logit model, highest risk bid contract (4
th
 
bid contract - 50% trigger, 80% coverage)   and rain-fed area are selected as the base cases and 
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the influences of the explanatory variables are expressed relative to their influence in the base 
case. The results are presented in Table7. 
 
Table 7: The factors influencing farmers‟ preference for the contract bids  
Bid 25% Trigger,  
100%  Coverage 
25% Trigger,  
80%   Coverage 
50%  Trigger,  
100%  Coverage 
 Coefficient    Robust  
Std. Error 
Coefficient    Robust  
Std. Error 
Coefficient    Robust 
Std. Error 
AGE_HH -.536542 .2286355 -.318295 .2361341 -.1424839* .2285926 
AGE_SQR .0048914 .0020812 .0027833 .0021294 .0013634 .0020876 
EDU_LVL 1.538475* .8821999 .0126642 .6070897 .0542027 .5838011 
SCP_INDEX .0479856*** .0132559 .0460936*** .0134274 .0578491 .0125742 
IND_INDEX .0057868 .0105278 -.0064772** .010435 -.0016619* .0100819 
AST_INDEX .0037058 .0246507 -.0097576** .0221332 -.0224276* .0211446 
AWR_INDEX .000145* .0080371 -.0016731 .0075772 -.0021658 .0068933 
LOG_EXP-PC .4370879* 1.121598 -.5294897* .8634272 .3903087* .8349556 
LAB_CAP .4454488 .3348031 .6252325 .3189738 .3847385 .2899588 
FAM_SIZE -.6391164 .2664661 -.5446482 .2565901 -.3418533* .236381 
MAJ_IRR .8120786 .7697659 .1060952 .7289062 .2157784 .7170418 
MIN_IRR 2.132335* .9927099 1.533167* .9042899 2.062953 .8479137 
INTERCEPT 8.161169* 6.041402 5.518685* 6.097014 -.6990855* 5.738567 
Numb Ob. 88 66 104 
Pseudo R2       =     0.7725 
Log pseudo likelihood = -179.26841 
Note: 50%  trigger, 80% coverage bid contract  was  base value for contract scenarios  (60 observation ) 
           Rain-fed farmers were  base value for irrigation types  
          *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
 
Of the main findings that emerge from the regressions‟ results in this sample, farm 
household log expenditure per capita (LOG_EXP-PC) was the most significant factor of a 
farmer‟s bid contract selection for the future risk reduction across all the communities. In 
addition to considering the marginal effects of the coefficient, if a one unit increase in farm 
household log expenditure per capita (LOG_EXP-PC) for the 1st bid contract (25% trigger, 
100% coverage) relative to a 4
th
 bid contract (50% trigger, 80% coverage), the 1
st
 bid contract 
would be expected to increase by 0.43 units while holding all other variables in the model 
constant. Similar interpretations apply to 2
nd
 bid contract (25% trigger, 80% coverage) which 
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would decrease by 0.52 and 3
rd
 bid contract (50% trigger, 100% coverage) which would be 
increased by 0.39 units. 
The social capital index (SCP_INDEX) was significant in the models developed for 
1
st
and 2
nd
bid contract samples. However, this variable was not significant in the 3
rd
 bid contract 
relative to base contract. This index was positively associated with farmer preferences for risk-
averse decisions compared to risk- taker bid contracts. Income diversification (IND_INDEX) and 
asset indexes (AST_INDEX) were negatively significant for the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 bid contracts. Thus, 
other things held constant. As we expected, it may imply that more assets‟ base and income 
sources are less risky, which may shift preference towards risk tolerance contract decisions.  The 
awareness index (AWR_INDEX) and the education level of a farmer (EDU_LVL) variables 
were  positive and statistically significant, This coefficient estimate indicates that more aware 
farmers and more educated farmers are more likely to prefer low risk insurance contracts rather 
than higher risk contracts.  It appears that way in our 1
st
 bid contract model. The minor irrigation 
variable (MIN_IRR) was significant and had a positive influence on the preference of selection 
of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 bid contracts compared to the rain-fed farmers. The marginal effects of the 
coefficient MIN_IRR implies that if a one unit increase in MIN_IRR for 1
st
 and 2
nd
 bid contracts 
relative to 4
th
 rain-fed farmers, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 bid contracts would be expected to increase by 2.1 and 
1.5units, respectively while holding all other variables in the model constant. However, major 
irrigation community was not significant any bid contract when compared to rain-fed farmers. 
Farmer‟s Age (AGE_HH) is negatively significant for the 3rd bid contract; it confirmed that 
younger farmers were more likely to choose a risk tolerance plan than their elders. Farm size 
(FAM_SIZE) also negatively influenced the on 3
rd
 bid contract choices. It appears, therefore, that 
more farmers who own more land have a low in probability to choose more risky insurance 
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contracts. The variables, labor capital (LAB_CAP) and age square (AGE_SQR) were not 
statistically significant in these models. 
 
Preferences for Insurance Plan, Premium Frequency and Delivery Choice: The second 
examined attribute is an insurance plan preference, which is evaluated at two levels.  It includes 
participating in insurance schemes as a group or an individual. The majority of the farmers in the 
three irrigation areas (87%)   preferred to join a group rather than an individual plan. In the 
irrigated area, this group preference is very high.  
Farmers were asked one question regarding their preference premium frequency. On 
average, farmers derive approximately 50% of their preference from a monthly premium 
collection method. This attribute is very much exhibited in irrigated areas. Farmers from rain-fed 
areas report higher proportions of weekly premium frequency than the others, even though a 
considerable amount of monthly payment preference is also reported.  One-time payment for 
crop session is not significant in rain-fed area but farmer in irrigated area preferred this attribute.  
The survey then asked their preferred most suitable and convince work organization for 
insurance delivery. The majority of farmers highlight that the farmer organization (FA) was the 
most suitable organization structure for work as stakeholder in the insurance supply chain.   
However, some farmers prefer other organization such as burial society, rotating savings and 
credit association (ROSCA).Therefore, such organizations were grouped together to construct a 
variable called “Others” for interpretation. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.  
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Table 8: Farmers preference of insurance attributes by irrigation types- Percentage  
Attributes of insurance design Rain-fed 
 
(N=48)   
Minor  
Irrigation 
(N=56)   
Major 
Irrigation 
(N=54)   
Total 
 
(N=158)   
Insurance Plan     
 Group  80 88 92 87 
 Individual 20 12 8 13 
Premium Frequency     
 One-time  for crop session 10 27 30 22 
 Monthly  30 52 65 49 
 Weekly 60 21 5 29 
Delivery  Choice     
 Farmer organization (FA) 85 90 93 89 
 Other organizations 15 10 7 11 
Source: Microinsurance for Agricultural Risk Mitigation in Sri Lanka, Field Survey- 2010 
 
Understanding the relationships between the all attributes and irrigation types, the 
multinomial and conditional logit models were estimated using STATA statistical software. The 
estimated parameters are presented in Table 9. Since the attributes had few levels each, one level 
was left out as base during estimation. This importance score gives the relative share of the rank 
influence that is due to each attribute of insurance product. The overall explanatory power of the 
estimate is good with a pseudo-R
2
 of 0.76. The signs are positive on the level of each attribute 
that is more preferred.  
The group based insurance plan is strongly significant (p<0.01) and has the expected 
positive sign in all the irrigation areas, implying that paddy farmers in the study area prefer 
grouped base rather than individual plan in this analysis too.  
High relative monthly premium frequency has the expected positive sign for all the 
irrigation areas but is not significant for the rain-fed area (p<0.05). Weekly premium frequency 
has a positive sign in rain fed area and minor irrigation areas, indicating that respondents prefer 
weekly premium pay relative to one-time payment, which is not statistically significant and 
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negative for the major irrigation areas. However, both premium pay options are significant in this 
study area compared to the one time pay option. 
Table  9: Estimated Maximum Likelihood Parameter of Insurance Attributes 
Attributes of Insurance Design Rain-fed Minor  
Irrigation 
Major 
Irrigation 
Total 
Insurance Plan     
 Group 2.2623*** 
(0.2472) 
2.5282*** 
(0.2864) 
2.1590*** 
(0.2659) 
2.2475*** 
(0.1899) 
 Individual Base value 
Premium Frequency     
 Monthly 0.2578 
(0.3063) 
1.1031*** 
(0.3193) 
1.4826*** 
(0.2539) 
1.2824*** 
(0.1883) 
 Weekly 1.2052*** 
(0.2899) 
-0.9071*** 
(0.3642) 
-0.4071 
(0.3808) 
0.5796*** 
(0.3231) 
 One-time  for crop session Base value 
Delivery  Choice     
 Farmer Organization 2.9552 *** 
(0.3732) 
3.3246 *** 
(0.3657) 
3.3274 *** 
(0.4101) 
2.3816 *** 
(0.2898) 
 Other Organizations Base value 
Bid Combination     
 25% Trigger, 100%  Coverage -0.2451 
(0.3110) 
0.3841* 
(0.2348) 
0.6025* 
(0.2543) 
0.3183* 
(0.2925)  25% Trigger, 80%   Coverage 
      
 25% Trigger, 100%  Coverage -0.4081 
(0.3717) 
1.5672*** 
(0.2023) 
1.3012*** 
(0.2991) 
0.4879*** 
(0.2220)  50% Trigger, 100%  Coverage 
      
 25% Trigger, 80%   Coverage 0.3251 *** 
(0.4562) 
0.5654 *** 
(0.3622) 
0.4757 
(0.4293)   
0.6452 
(0.2696)   50% Trigger, 100%  Coverage 
      
 25% Trigger, 80%   Coverage 0.3015 *** 
(0.2148) 
0.3241* 
(0.2148) 
0.1491 
(0.2556)   
0.1893 * 
(0.1623)  50% Trigger,  80%   Coverage 
      
 50% Trigger, 100%  Coverage 1.2652* 
(0.2471) 
0.2639 
(0.2339) 
0.0062  
(0.2781)   
0.1924 * 
(0.1761)  50% Trigger,  80%   Coverage 
      
 25% Trigger, 100%  Coverage Base value 
 50% Trigger,  80%   Coverage 
Number of obs. 48 56 54 158 
Pseudo R2       =      0.6248 0.811 0.5925 0.7622 
Log likelihood =  -158.26                  -126.84                  168.41                  -149.26                  
Note:          *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
 
Results raveled that lower trigger (25%) values significant at irrigated area and higher 
tolerance trigger levels (50%) are observed in rain-fed area. However, whatever the trigger 
levels, 100% coverage option is highly significant at irrigated area. A 50% bid contract pair 
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option is significant only at rain-fed area, which implies that farmers are less likely to choose 
costly options. However, this estimated results indicate that some of the farmers in all area, 
consider mix options to be beneficial since it shows the disparity of the market.  
Delivery choice as a farmer organization has a positive impact and is also highly 
significant (p<0.01) in all the systems. This is implied and we can conclude that there is the 
possibility of linking the role of farmer organization and insurance markets more closely.  This 
link can be facilitate to the adoption of a farmers centered, farmer owned, farmers managed 
participatory approach for insurance design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
strategies to insurance scheme. 
Examining the relationships between the socioeconomic characteristics of paddy farmers 
and their product choice behavior is vital to developing a product design and justification of 
microinsurance necessity. Therefore, in order to determine the impact of farmer characteristic on 
a other product attributes according to the product choice ranks, we considered only group plan 
preferences. According to the results, 87 percent of farmers prefer this plan, and then select high 
ranked four realizable products for conjoint analysis, which represents 74% of farmers in the 
sample.  
The regression coefficients are estimates of part-worth contribution of each insurance 
product combination. Coefficients for these combinations represent the contribution relative to 
the reference choices set or product combination. For convenience, product E or choice set 
(Group/Other/Monthly), which is ranked as five and rain-fed area was assigned as the references. 
Thus computed coefficients indicated the packaging options impact on liking relative to product 
E. Positive coefficients indicate that the option increases liking, while negative coefficients 
indicate that the option yields less liking than product E.  
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Table 10: The impact of farmer characteristic on a different other product attributes 
Explanatory variables Product Choice Set  
A  (3) B (1) C(2) D(4) 
AGE_HH -0.6623** -0.5045** -0.0190 -0.6231** 
AGE_SQR 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
EDU_LVL 0.1148 0.0133** 0.1468** 0.1417** 
SCP_INDEX 0.2157** 0.2162*** 0.2210*** 0.2443** 
IND_INDEX 0.0502 0.0885** 0.1859*** 0.1308** 
AST_INDEX 0.1604** 0.0037 0.1102* 0.2002** 
AWR_INDEX 0.0373 0.0015 0.0368 0.0132 
LOG_EXP-PC 0.2148* 0.0653** 0.1948*** 0.0601** 
LAB_CAP 0.1258 0.0262 0.2144*** 0.1345* 
FAM_SIZE 0.0006 0.0026 0.2962** 0.0008 
MAJ_IRR 0.5373** 0.5653** 0.03680 0.0132 
MIN_IRR 0.0148 0.2350** 0.3948** 0.0601 
INTERCEPT 4..6612 2.2077 3.3519 0.6231 
Note:          *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
 
The relative importance from the conjoint analysis indicates that Product B choice set 
(Group/FA/Monthly) has become a more important insurance product and is signified by the 
negative sign on the age of household head, but education, social capital, income diversification 
and expenditure variables are positively significant. , this product B is preferred for major 
irrigation and minor irrigation area.  In addition to product C choice set (Group/FA/Weekly), is 
dependent on asset base and labor capital with farm size. It means the weekly premium is based 
on farmers‟ wealth. This product is also preferred in minor irrigation area farmer with rain fed 
area on comparatively. Product A choice set (Group/FA/One-time), One time premium attributes 
is likely to major irrigation farmers and it is significantly dependent on framers‟ assets base and 
social capital variables at 5% level, expenditure factor is significant at 10 % level. 
Product D choice set (Group/Other/One-time), is presenting farmer‟s willingness to work 
with other organization than farmer organization and onetime payment methods.  The preference 
of Product D choice set, age of household, social capital, education and expenditure variables are 
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significant factors at 1 % level.  In addition to the, labor capital capacity is positively significant 
for farmers‟ preference at 10 % level and not significant any irrigation areas.  
CONCLUSION  
This paper reports the results of a contingent valuation survey that elicits producers‟ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for Index Based Microinsurance (IBMS) and farmers‟ preferences for 
insurance attributes.  There is robust evidence suggesting that this type of insurance scheme is 
well accepted by peasants, and that the potential demand for insurance in the survey area is very 
high. Results indicate that the strongest influence on willingness to pay is social capital variable 
and that demand is more concentrated in irrigated areas. Observed preferences affecting 
willingness to pay are highly location specific. Some classic explanatory variables were 
significant in the variation on spatial and insurance contracts. Furthermore, Choice experiments 
tool was used for the understanding of farmers‟ preferences for insurance attributes.  Most 
farmers in irrigated areas showed more risk-averse behavior than farmers in rain-fed areas. In 
terms of farmers‟ perceptions about harm and coverage levels, irrigated area farmers preferred 
low damage contracts and high coverage levels, which were likely more important in their WTP 
decisions, as shown by the relatively high mean values in this category.  We found that farmers 
in rain-fed areas were less likely to buy insurance and have a low mean WTP. However, the 
study exhibited more scattered WTP values, even within each irrigation type. Outliers in terms of 
WTP vales can be better served through innovative interventions. Farmers in the study area 
prefer grouped base than individual plan. However, premium frequencies were indicating 
considerable variability. 
Participatory design attracts great attention from designers working within 
microinsurance. Social capital exhibited a high influence on famer‟s preferences. Therefore a 
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participatory or community-based approach to insurance design where farmers are involved in 
design based on their own requirements is advisable.  
These findings vividly demonstrated the complexity of the issues in the rural context and 
pragmatic barriers for participation to uniform insurance scheme, which also help our 
understanding for segmentation of microinsurance and gives invaluable insights to need of 
microinsurance scheme. However, this complexity can generate more economic welfare to 
farmer as well as insurer through the diversification. This demand-led approach may provide 
more benefits than a supply-led design.  In this context we can conclude that a uniformly 
structured crop insurance product does not achieve maximum efficiency. Therefore, to improve 
effectiveness, products should be designed and implemented with the synergies of different 
approaches. For example, price discrimination and spatial discrimination with regard to disaster 
or peril, as well as farmers‟ other requirements. 
Any index based insurance program requires well-developed infrastructure and 
institutional network arrangements in order to run an efficient and effective insurance system. 
Such conditions can be relatively difficult to find in developing countries.  However, in Sri 
Lanka the well established high density network of meteorological stations, availability of 
historical data, favorable rural financial culture, and the comparatively well-educated and literate 
population can help bridge this gap. The high level of social organization, including a 
widespread network of banking and microfinance institutions, a postal network, an agrarian 
services network, an established telecommunication system and retail network offer a potential 
platform to deliver microinsurance products.  Moreover, if well established farm organizations 
can be linked with the insurance supply chain and would be developed with more trust than if it 
were developed by a commercial insurance company. The survey reveals that farmers are more 
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interested in working with the farmer organizations. Up to now microinsurance in Sri Lanka has 
mostly been concentrated on the health sector. Outreach seems to be rather limited. However, 
microinsurance providers will be able to reach a much higher number of clients in the agriculture 
sector by bundling health with crop-products or unbundling contract design. There are clear 
indications that the framework conditions are also favorable for microinsurance development in 
the agricultural sector, but further research is needed to investigate this supply side perspective in 
order to initiate IBMS in Sri Lanka. 
Note: 
1
 In Sri Lanka, the composition of agricultural land under small holdings is 80 percent and 
average farm is less than 2.5 acres. Agricultural Census -2002 
2
Agrarian Service Center is the lowest agricultural administrative unit in the Sri Lanka consisting 
usually of four to five villages 
3
 The General Certificate of Education (GCE) Ordinary Level (O/L) and  Advance Level (A/L) 
conducted by the Department of Examinations of the Ministry of Education in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Barnett, B. J. and Mahul, O., 2007, Weather index insurance for agriculture and rural areas in lower-
income countries, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89 (5), pp.1241-1247. 
 
Barnett, B. J., Barrett, C. B. and Skees, J. R. ,2008, Poverty traps and index based risk transfer 
products,World Development, 36 (10), pp.1766-1785. 
 
Bhattamishra, R. and Barrett, C. B., 2008, Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements: An 
Overview and Implications for Social Fund Program Design, Social Protection Discussion Paper, 
World Bank. 
 
Churchill, C. (eds.), 2006, Protecting the Poor: A Microinsurance Compendium. Geneva: Munich Re 
Foundation and International Labor Organisation.  
 
Clarke, D. and Dercon, S., 2009,Insurance, Credit and Safety Nets for the Poor in a World of Risk, 
Working Papers81,  Department of Economics and Social Affairs. United Nations 
 
DCS-SL, 2010, Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka,available URL 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk 
 
Dercon, S. (eds.), 2005, Insurance against Poverty, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Dercon, S., Kirchberger, M., Gunning, J.W. and Platteau, J., 2008, Literature review on microinsurance, 
Geneva, International Labour Organization.  
 
30 
 
DMC-SL, 2010, Disaster Management Center, Sri Lanka, Ministry of Disaster Management, available 
URLwww.dmc.gov.lk 
 
Dror, I., 2007, Social Capital and Microinsurance: Insights from Field Evidence in India. Microfinance 
Insights, 5,pp. 22-24. 
 
Gine, X., Townsend, R.M. and Vickery, J.I., 2007, Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural 
India, World Bank Policy Research Working Pape,  No.4408, World Bank. 
 
Glauber, J.W. ,2004, Crop insurance reconsidered.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(5), 
pp. 1179-1195. 
 
Grootaert, C., 1999, Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia- Local Level Institutions 
Study, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
Network, Washington DC, World Bank. 
 
Grootaert, C., Narayan, D., Jones, N. and Woolcock, M.,2003, Measuring social capital: an integrated 
questionnaire,World Bank Working Paper No. 18, Washington DC, World Bank.  
 
Gunatilake, H., Yang, J., Pattanayak, S. and  Choe,  K., 2007,Good Practices for Estimating Reliable 
Willingness-to-Pay Values in the Water Supply and Sanitation sector,Philippines, Asian 
Development Bank. 
Haefele, M.A. and Loomis, J.B., 2001 , Improving Statistical Efficiency and Testing Robustness of 
Conjoint Marginal Valuations, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83,5, pp. 1321-1327. 
 
Hanemann, M. W. and Kanninen, B., 1996, The Statistical Analysis of Discrete-Response 
CV data, Working Paper No.798, Dpt.ofAgr.and Res. Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley.  
 
Hazell, P. B. R.,1992,The appropriate role of agricultural insurance in developing countries. Journal of 
International Development, 4 (6), pp. 567-581. 
 
Leftley, R. and Roth, J., 2006, Beyond MFIs and community-based models: Institutional alternatives,in 
Protecting the poor, A microinsurance compendium, ed. Churchill, C., Geneva, Munich Re 
Foundation and International Labor Organization.  
 
Levin, T. and  Reinhard, D.,2006,Microinsurance aspects in agricultural insurance. Munich: Munich Re. 
Foundation.  
 
LLOYDS,2009, Insurance in developing countries: Exploring opportunities in 
microinsurance,Lloyd‟s360° Risk Insight and Microinsurance Centre, available 
URLhttp://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/5CFE7CAF-0075-415C-B0F2-
BEBF0323059E/0/Microinsurancereport_Nov2009.pdf 
 
McCarthy, N., 2003, Demand for Rainfall Index insurance: A Case Study from Morocco. EFTD 
Discussion Paper No 106. Washington DC: Environment and Production Technology Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
 
Mechler, R., Linnerooth-Bayer, J.andPeppiatt, D., 2006, Disaster Insurance for the poor?: A review of 
microinsurance for natural disaster risks in developing countries,ProVention/IIASA Study. 
 
31 
 
Miranda, M.J. (1991). Area yield crop insurance reconsidered. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics ,73(2) :  233-242. 
 
Nieuwoudt, W.L. (2000). An economic evaluation of a crop insurance programme for small-scale 
commercial farmers in South Africa.Agrekon, 39(3): 269-291. 
Osgood, D., Warren, D. (2007) Drought insurance in Malawi. In: Hellmuth M, Moorhead A, Thomson 
MC,Williams J (eds) Climate risk management in Africa: learning from practice. International 
Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI). New York: Columbia University, p.75–88. 
Patrick, G. E., 1988,Mallee Wheat Farmers‟ Demand for Crop Insurance, Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 32(1), pp. 37-49. 
Patt, A., Peterson, N., Carter, M., Velez, M., Hess, U. and Suarez, P., 2009, Making index insurance 
attractive to farmers, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 14(8), pp.737-753. 
Putnam, R., 1993,The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. The American 
Prospect, No 13, (spring), pp. 35-42. 
Rambukwella, R.N.K., Vidanapathirana, R.P. and Somaratne, T.G. (2009).Evaluation of Crop Insurance 
Scheme in Sri Lanka, Colombo, Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute 
(HARTI). 
Roth, J. and McCord, M.J., 2008, Agricultural microinsurance: global practices and prospects, Appleton, 
Wisconsin, Microinsurance Centre. 
 
Roth, J., McCord, M. J. and Liber, D., 2007,The Landscape of Microinsurance in the World‟s 100 Poorest 
Countries, Appleton, Wisconsin, MicroInsurance Centre 
 
Saleem,  S., Coble,  K. H., Hudson, D., Miller, J. C., Hanson T.R. and  Sempier, S.H., 2008, Willingness 
to Pay for a Potential Insurance Policy: Case Study of Trout Aquaculture, Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Review, 37(1),pp. 1-10. 
Sarris, A., Krfakis, P. and Christiaensen, L., 2006, Producer Demand and Welfare Benefits of Rainfall 
Insurance in Tanzania.  FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Working paper Number 18, Rome. 
Skees, J. R., 2001,The Potential Role of Weather Markets for U.S. Agriculture.The Climate Report Vol.2, 
No 4. Climate Risk Solutions, Inc. 
 
Skees, J., and Barnett, B., 2006, Enhancing microfinance using index based risk-transfer products, 
Agricultural Finance Review, 66, pp. 235–250. 
 
Skees, J.R., Barnett, B.J. and Hartell, J., 2006, Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 
International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia (August 
12–18, 2006), available URLhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/25548/1/cp060649.pdf 
 
Skees, J.R.,Hazell, P. and Miranda, M., 1999, New Approaches to Crop Yield Insurance in Developing 
Countries, EPDT Discussion Paper No. 55, Washington, International Food Research Institute. 
 
32 
 
Skees, J., A. Murphy, Collier,B., McCord,M. J. and Roth,J.,2008,  Scaling Up Index Insurance: What is 
needed for the next big step forward?, German Financial Cooperation,available 
URLhttp://www.globalagrisk.com/Pubs/2007_Skeesetal_Scaling%20UP%20Index%20Insurance
_KfW_dec.pdf 
 
Smith, V.H. and Watts, M., n.d.,  Index Based Agricultural Insurance in Developing Countries: 
Feasibility, Scalability and Sustainability, A Paper submitted to the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, available URLhttp://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/research/seminars/files/vsmith-index-
insurance.pdf 
 
Sri Lanka National Agricultural Policy (SLNAP), 2006, available 
URLhttp://www.mimrd.gov.lk/upload/docs/1253183180AgPolicy4.pdf 
 
Sri Lanka National Agricultural Policy-Draft   (SLNAP-D), 2006, available 
URLhttp://www.agridept.gov.lk/content/admin/images/National%20Agricultural%20Policy.pdf 
Tabor, S. R., 2005, Community-based Health Insurance and Social Protection Policy, Social Protection 
Discussion Paper No. 0503,Social Protection, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Varangis P., 2002, Innovative approach to cope with weather risk in developing countries.The Climate 
Report, 2 (2), Climate Risk Solutions Inc. 
Vedenov, D. V. and Barnett, B. J., 2004, Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance 
Instruments, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 29(3), pp. 387-403. 
Vandeveer, M. L. and  Loehman, E. T., 1994, Farmer response to modified crop insurance: a case study 
of corn in Indiana: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 76, pp. 128-140. 
 
Zubair, L., 2002,  El-Niño-Southern Oscillation Influences on Rice Production in Sri Lanka, International 
Journal of Climatology, 22(2), pp. 249-260. 
Zubair, L., Ralapanawe, V., Tennakoon, U., Yahiya, Z. and Perera, R., 2005,  Natural Disaster Risks in 
Sri Lanka: Mapping Hazards and Risk Hotspots, in Natural Disaster Hotspots Case Studies, ed. 
Arnold, M., World Bank,  pp.109-136. 
                                               
Note: 
1 In Sri Lanka, the composition of agricultural land under small holdings is 80 percent and average farm is less than 
2.5 acres. Agricultural Census -2002 
2 Agrarian Service Center  is the lowest agricultural administrative unit in the Sri Lanka consisting usually of four to 
five villages 
3 The General Certificate of Education (GCE) Ordinary Level (O/L) and  Advance Level (A/L) conducted by the 
Department of Examinations of the Ministry of Education in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
 
